

Critically analyse Putin's steps to recentralize political authority

On the 8th July 2000, Putin, delivering his first annual address to the federal assembly, detailed his plans for the Russian Federation's future. In his address he stressed 'we do have a decentralized state', and argued that whilst this problem continued, progress in other spheres would be blocked; putting in motion a number of reforms aimed at recentralizing the state and political authority (Putin 2000). The pre-Putinite decentralisation created a federal set up which led to the establishment of 'separate islands of power', who were 'competing' in a 'mutually destructive fight observed by those for whom disorder and corruption is advantageous' (Putin 2000). This essay will, in particular, analyse Putin's efforts to recentralise political authority over the federal units, as his legacy continues to provoke debate regarding the effectiveness, intentions and implications of the reforms. The dispute over the 'authoritarian' aspect of his reforms is perhaps the most dominant; with a number of scholars arguing the reforms have terrible implications for Russian democracy. This essay will argue that, regardless of shortcomings and moral debates, the reforms have been a success in the furthering of Russian modernisation and progression, through much needed stabilisation.

It is important to examine the pre-Putinite federal situation, as an analysis of his reforms cannot be complete without acknowledging the backdrop of challenges Russia faced (Sakwa 2008b: 879). Richard Sakwa argues the intensity of the debate over Putin's reform is partially due to 'people making judgements on the basis of a de-contextualised absolutism of principles', and therefore ignoring the importance of Russia's recent history (2008b: 879). When Putin came to power the regional decentralization had seemingly grown out of control; Yeltsin's encouragement to 'take as much sovereignty as you can swallow' had led to the formation of completely separate power processes and the delineation of law and

order (Kahn 2001: 377). There are 182 distinct nationalities and 21 Ethnic Republics within the federation, a potential rise of ethnic tensions was exacerbated by the lack of central control and uniformity (Sakwa 2008a: 216). Such a problem occurred in Sakha, for example; the assertion of their culture led to a counter-assertion from the Russian communities. This resulted in a controversial celebration of the anniversary of Yakutia's incorporation into Russia and the formation of a distinctive Russian Community (Balzer & Vinokurova 1996: 103-106). Furthermore, the autonomy granted, when coinciding with nationalists coming to power, created the potential for the promotion of separatist movements (Sakwa 2008a: 215). This impacted upon Chechnya especially; leading to a conflict which was not resolved until Putin's presidency. An international dimension further exacerbated the problem; Tatarstan, in response to Russia's potential assistance to the Serbians in Kosovo threatened to send Muslim volunteers, and in Dagestan the Azerbaijani leader, Heydar Aliyev, was thought to have had more influence in the republic than Yeltsin had (Sakwa 2008a: 266)(Ware & Kisriev 2001).

Another dimension, which had blocked Russia's progression, was the economic implications of autonomy. The lack of central control led to regional control of resources; creating oligarchs and elites who had both political and economical power. (Sakwa 2008a: 250). In Tatarstan, for example, 65% of the wealth was controlled by the governing elites (Sakwa 2008a: 265). This, linked with the lack of restraints from the centre, resulted in regional executives becoming almost like barons of individual fiefdoms; who often represented organised crime, business interests and corruption (Sakwa 2004: 48-51). Both Putin and the Interior Ministry highlighted this problem, arguing the criminalization of the regions had led to organised crime controlling 50% of private, and 60% of state, enterprise (Herd 109)(Sakwa 2004: 50-51). Furthermore, these actions divided the economic space; Putin argued that 'border posts were set up to separate Russia's boundaries and regions', which were undermining Russia's economical potential (Herd 2001: 110).

These issues threatened the end of the federation and the emergence of confederation or asymmetrical federalism, as regional barons created mini-dictatorships (Sakwa 2008a: 226, 261, 281-283). The control of the law lay with these governors who were directing their regional institutions. The centre had no way to pursue their legislative agenda or to ensure law was uniform across the Federation; demonstrated by the fifty contradicting regional constitutions (Chubarov 2001: 263) (Sakwa 2004: 133). These factors were detrimental to Russia's progression and modernisation, as asymmetrical federalism created a zero sum situation where imbalance between regions thrived (Chenbankova 2008: 992) (Sakwa 2008a: 228). Therefore Putin's initial reforms aimed to undermine and restrain the regional barons whilst dismantling the power bases they had cultivated (Chubarov 2001: 262).

The implementation, on May 13th 2000, of seven federal districts each headed by a Presidential Representative, or Polpredy, was the first step in the recentralization of political authority through the creation of a stronger vertical structure¹ (Chubarov 2001: 262). The Federal districts coincided with the military district infrastructure, and only two of the initial Polpredy had a fully civilian background. Cherkesov and Poltavchenko came from the Security infrastructure whilst Pulikovskiy and Kazantsev were 'heroes of the Chechen war'² (Petrov 2002: 82). This gave the Polpredy the ability to access the 'command and control networks' which they were already affiliated with (Ross 2002: 140). Their work, in their respective districts, was to 'gather the state' through the federal agencies, whilst supervising the implementation of federal policy (Sakwa 2008a: 267). The new structure had various successes; the districts were already compatible with the Military Districts and with institutions such as the Ministry of Emergencies, whilst the Justice Ministry, Tax Ministry and Treasury adapted with little trouble (Sakwa 2008a: 269)(Petrov 2002: 80). Due to the main regional offices of many agencies being relocated to the district capital, the regional barons lost a great source of control, and became constrained by the Polpredy that

¹ For a list of regions and Polpredy as of 2003, see appendix 1

² For a regional map demonstrating the new regions, see appendix 2

now supervised them (Sakwa 2004: 144,157)(Sakwa 2008a: 269,270). Therefore, the governors became increasingly dependent on the centre, through their dependency on the Polpredy, which advanced Putin's aims to recentralise political authority (Petrov 2002: 88)(Sakwa 2004: 145).

There were, however, shortcomings in this area of reform. Sakwa, for example, argues that the new structure is not vertical as intended, but has instead created a triangle between regional bosses, Polpredy and Moscow (Sakwa 2004: 131). Therefore, conflict between Moscow and the Regions has only been displaced and has intensified the bureaucratic conflict by adding a new layer (Sakwa 2008a: 269,270, 281-283). Furthermore, the physical aspects of the Federal Districts highlight a number of weaknesses. A number of regions believe they are not part of the right district, as was seen by Bashkortostan's protests following their placement in the Volga District rather than the Urals (Petrov 2002: 79). Due to the size of each district, and the amount of regions in each, they are not politically or economically integrative, and the Polpredy cannot understand the problems of each region (Petrov 2002: 76,88). Medvedev has acknowledged this limitation through the creation of a new North Caucasus District, which has divided the Southern District into smaller parts so that the problems can be better handled (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2010). However, Medvedev's move has also demonstrated his faith in the idea of the districts, and has highlighted how the structure put in place by Putin is a successful basis of an efficient framework.

The role of the Polpredy has also caused debate in the last decade. Their powers, Chebankova has argued, are poorly defined as they are only given extremely general guidelines and their role varies greatly dependent upon the Polpredy himself (2008: 943). Kazantsev, for example, shows a great deal of enthusiasm over his role, whilst Poltavchenko and Cherkesov are less visible, perhaps due to their previous careers within the security

network (Petrov 2002: 82). Their focuses also vary, with some being extremely zealous in their fight against corruption compared to others (Petrov 2002: 82). This, combined with their critical lack of resources, has led some scholars to see them as failing to 'transform their offices into means of centre-regional integration' and therefore as being inefficient at recentralising political authority (Chebankova 2008: 997). However, this view confuses the role of the Polpredy, who were not put into place solely to rival the governors. Instead they provide a supervisory role and have achieved a great deal; fundamentally changing the dynamics of the Centre-Regional relationship and successfully dispossessing the governors' control in a number of regions (Sakwa 2008a: 269-270). Furthermore, they have become a chain of support in the regions for Putin and Medvedev; having a significant role in reforms such as the pursuit of a single legal space (Chebankova 2008: 943)(Sakwa 2004: 45). Khloponin's reception as the Polpred of the Northern Caucasus highlights this role; Ingush President Yevkurov argues that Khloponin is a manager, 'who will boost the economy and fight corruption' (RIA Novosti 2010)

Coinciding with the creation of the Federal Districts were the reforms which aimed to change the structure of the Federal Council at the centre; with the intention of 'strengthening and cementing Russian statehood' (Sakwa 2008a: 270). The Governors were now stripped of immunity (Chubarov 2001: 263). Furthermore, they were removed from the Federal Council and replaced by senators, one nominated by the regional executive branch and another by the legislative branch (Sakwa 2004: 146)(Chubarov 2001: 263). Early shortcomings were efficiently overcome. A law was introduced that ensured each senator had a 10 year residency in their region, overcoming the 70% of senators who were from Moscow and had little affiliation with their region (Chebankova 2008: 995). By limiting the regional bosses' need to be in Moscow Putin effectively displaced them from the corridors of power and removed from them an important bargaining position (Chubarov 2001: 263)(Sakwa 2004:

146,155). They no longer had the ability to effectively promote their interests and the interests of economic elites they were affiliated with (Chubarov 2001: 263).

Putin, in his first round of reforms also desired 'dictatorship of the law' and a 'single legal space'; an important facet of recentralisation (Putin 2000). Implementation of universal law and citizenship aimed to reign in the regional barons' despotism, whilst strengthening the centre's power over law and order (Sakwa 2004: 63, 91). Putin, in 2006, argued that the unity of legal space was the most important national priority (Sakwa 2008a: 271-272). On the 11th of May 2000, decrees were issued that attempted to get Ingushetia, Amur and Bashkortostan to bring their regional laws and constitution into compatibility with federal laws and the central constitution (Sakwa 2008a: 271). This offensive was expanded in June, when the constitutional court declared all sovereignty claims unconstitutional, demanding their repudiation (Sakwa 2004: 139). The expansion continued until 2003, when it was demanded that by 2005 all regional laws that contradicted federal law had to be removed or made compatible.

The campaign seemed successful in 2001, when Yuri Chaika, Justice Minister, announced 94% of regional laws had been made compatible. However, many have argued this is not the case; the Security Council in June 2001 argued legislation in Tatarstan and North Ossetia remained significantly divergent, and Sakha's constitution contained 57 contradictory articles (Sakwa 2008a: 271-272). Furthermore, Chebankova has suggested that in some areas violations grew, highlighting the increase of 28% in the Urals District during 2003 (Chebankova 2008: 934). However, Courts became funded solely from the federal budget, which ended their dependence on the regions and further empowered the centre over future legislation (Sakwa 2004: 138). In addition, no matter how selective the spread of harmonization was, it was a beginning of stabilisation; universal laws and citizenship undermined regionalism by undermining the regional hold on legislative agenda (Sakwa 2008a: 228-234).

The Kozak commission furthered this goal; established on the 26th June 2001 the commission examined the role of bi-lateral treaties (Sakwa 2008a: 280). A number of regions had utilised their bi-lateral treaties as a defence of legal divergences (Sharlet 2003: 339). Kozak, in response to this, declared all treaties superfluous and by 20th May 2003 thirty three treaties had been renounced (Sharlet 2003: 338)(Sakwa 2008a: 273). Furthermore, on July the 7th all treaties had to be renewed to be compatible, or be made invalid (Sakwa 2008a: 273). There were only two exceptions, Chechnya, which was a highly specialised case due to its recent history, and Tatarstan, which signed a new treaty in 2007 granting it concessions (Sakwa 2008a: 273). The President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has a great deal of freedom from centralised control; he is in possession of his own armed forces, divergent cultural laws and his own tax on business (Ostrovsky 2009: 15). He has also shown interest in federal property, such as Grozny Airport, further decentralising control in Chechnya (Ostrovsky 2009: 15). However, even though Chechnya and Tatarstan have retained autonomy, to focus on these two cases may be damaging to the attempt to see the effectiveness of Putin's reforms on the whole. These republics were only two out of eighty nine; the changing status of the other eighty seven regions and republics demonstrates how widespread the reforms were.

Therefore the first period of reforms aimed to recentralise political authority through the implementation of a single legal space and line of executive power (Sakwa 2004: 62). These were followed by the 2004 reforms, in which Governors were no longer to be elected but appointed from the centre. The origins of these reforms can be seen in both the limitations of these early reforms and the new challenges facing Russia; highlighted by the Beslan tragedy (Chebankova 2005: 933). Petrov argues that the initial reforms 'lost dynamism' in 2001, with compromise replacing the initial hard line rhetoric (2002: 73) (Chebankova 2005: 993, 944). Whilst, between January 2005 and March 2006, 73% of forty eight governors were reappointed rather than replaced, the ability to appoint gave the centre

greater control over the regions; as governors had a greater incentive to follow central rule (Sakwa 2008a: 275-277)(Chebankova 2006: 470). Furthermore, the lack of competition for appointments demonstrated the Kremlin's ability to get supporters appointed (Chebankova 2006: 465). In the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug, for example, the only candidates were the incumbent and the general director of the regional branch of Gazprom, a 'technical candidate' who had no intention of leaving his job (Chebankova 2006: 465).

Putin, since 2005, has further encouraged the merger of certain regions, allegedly based on socio-economic problems, resulting in the number of federal units shrinking to 83 (Derrick 2009: 1). This process can be seen within the realm of centralization; Derrick highlights the way in which the mergers occurred between ethnic autonomous okrugs into non-autonomous, non-ethnically defined, oblasts or krai (Derrick 2009: 4). Through incorporation, the autonomous indigenous populations have gone from a majority in their okrug, to minority in their new krai or oblast (Derrick 2009: 1-7). Autonomous okrugs are slowly disappearing and discussions point towards the same occurring with a number of ethnic republics, removing a source of regional autonomy (Derrick 2009: 7). Parallel to these reforms Putin invested time into the economic sphere in his attempts to recentralise authority. Whereas previously tax had been split evenly between the centre and the regions, the misdirection of funds caused a shift towards the centre and in 2003 the centre received 63% of tax (Hahn 2005: 163). In order to compensate for this new balancing the regions now receive more from the centre, the budget increasing to 700 billion rubles in 2003 from 200 billion in 2002 (Chebankova 2008: 999). This further increases dependence on the centre, as economic incentives are given to those regions that demonstrate loyalty.

Therefore, Putin has successfully recentralised state control and political authority. As demonstrated there are still problems remaining and a number of shortcomings. However, when studied in the context of the chaos caused by Yeltsin's decentralisation, it is clear that Putin has achieved a great deal in this field. The regions have been stabilised, and political

authority has been concentrated within the Presidency itself and the wider federal institutions in Moscow. However, the implications of this recentralisation are widely debated. A number of scholars suggest, as Sakwa has, that Putin has gone too far with recentralisation; destroying federalism and resorting to traditional 'hyper-centralism' (Sakwa 2008a: 255)(Remington 2005: 77). Chebankova, too, agrees with this analysis; arguing that Putin did not balance the needs of both state and region (Chebankova 2008: 992-993). The danger of this lies in the regions inability to provide a counter to Kremlin, allowing a strong state with little competition (Sakwa 2008a: 281-283). However, Kumar is correct in stating that, technically, there was no federalism previously; there can be no undermining or reversing a process which did not exist (2008: 94-95). Hahn also suggests that centralisation may create and exacerbate new problems (2005: 167). There is correlation between autonomy in the regions and the lack of ethnic conflict (Hahn 2005: 167). In the past diversity and autonomy has had a stabilising effect; Dagestan had 14 council members representing the main ethnicities and no individual executive, subduing any ethnic tension (Ware Krisiev 2001). As Putin has removed this autonomy, and moderate politicians in the republics have acquiesced to it, radicals are given political legitimacy, which may spark new mobilisation of nationalist movements (Hahn 2005: 167). Putin though has made such acts difficult; the removal of the most contentious governors has removed the tools of the regions away from those that may cause fractures (Alexseev 2001: 110). Furthermore, in general, diversity had the potential to be damaging; 'fragmenting [Russia] judicially, economically and in terms of sovereignty' (Sakwa 2008b: 887).

The rate of Putin's recentralisation has also raised moral questions. The 'hyper-centralisation' has been criticised as authoritarian; imposed from above and undermining democracy whilst the Presidency grows ever stronger (Remington 2005: 77)(Orttung 2004: 8). This has provoked anxiety over whether Russia is reverting to traditional central authoritarianism (Chebankova 2005: 933, 934)(Willerton 2005: 38). This is especially true

following Putin's decision to appoint governors, reminding critics of the Nomenklatura appointing Party Secretaries in the regions (Chebankova 2006: 459). Boris Berezovsky has criticized Putin's reforms in this area, stating

'[The reforms] will destroy the system of the balance of power, which is necessary for the normal functioning of any democratic government and market economy, significantly increase the authority of the executive branch of power at the expense of the legislative and limit citizens' participation in the representative management of government' (Ross 2002: 152).

Kumar, however, in his monograph on Putin's effect on democratic progression, argues this is typically a Western view and that Russians, in general, see it as necessary (Kumar 2008: 89). Therefore a more balanced view is needed instead of seeing the effects of recentralisation as being solely authoritarian in intention. The reforms should be seen as necessary; whilst not following democratic theory, they have stabilised Russia. Sakwa describes this as a process of 'Neo-Authoritarian Stabilisation' where Putin's recentralisation is both 'grave digger and facilitator of democratisation' (2008b: 882, 887). If seen in the context of the chaotic decade before Putin, it is clear he has united Russia and reinforced normality; facilitating Russia's future growth whilst only risking the 'staggering of democracy' (Kumar 2008: 102)(Willerton 2005: 18). At this stage of development control and stability were the key priorities (Slider 2005: 183). This is consistent with Putin's ethos, a strong state and economy had to come before a democratic ethos (Kumar 2008: 90). Therefore recentralisation can be seen as a pre-condition for modernisation, the state had to become a strong guiding hand for democracy, which it could not be without autonomy from other dominant power bases; such as the regions (Willerton 2005: 20)(Hahn 2005: 156)(Slider 2005: 182-183).

Paradoxically, Putin's recentralisation has led to the emergence of opposition that has the potential to undermine the centre's 'monolithic control' (Chebankova 2006: 475-476). On the 31st December 2005, a law was introduced that allows the majority party in the regional legislature to nominate a candidate for governor (Sakwa 2008a 275-277). This has created impressive competition within the regions, and the number of parties taking part has grown (Chebankova 2008: 1003). In the regional assemblies partisan composition has grown four times, which has undermined United Russia's dominance; in 2007 they received an average of 42%, and in some territories they received below 30% (Chebankova 2008: 1004). This could have implications for Moscow, as parties see the regions as a staging area; deploying regional politics in order to challenge Moscow on a national level (Chebankova 2006: 475-476). This has increased the role of the multi-party system, creating an incentive to compete and giving them real power at this level; therefore furthering, to a degree, democracy in Russia.

In conclusion, Putin's steps to recentralise authority have had a number of shortcomings, and have provoked an intense debate over the intentions and implications. These shortcomings may undermine his attempts, and it is unclear as of yet whether they will fully address long term issues that Russia faces (Orttung 2004: 6-8). However, if analysed in the context of the decade preceding Putin's presidency, it is clear that recentralisation has come a long way. Even though there is anxiety over a future autocracy, due to the 'authoritarian measures' it is fair to say that they are not camouflage for moves in this direction and are only a setback for consolidation of democracy (Ross 2002: 151) (Kumar 2008: 91). Instead recentralisation has created stability, which is of key importance at this stage of Russia's development, especially when compared with the chaos of Yeltsin's policies in this area. This stability gives the Kremlin the ability to modernise and direct policy without having to bargain with multiple power bases (Willerton 2005: 33-36). Therefore, regardless of the shortcomings and other debates, Putin's steps to recentralise political authority have been a

success. Stabilisation is the key for Russia's future, and has had a positive effect on her transformation in recent years, and will continue to provide a strong basis for future development.

Bibliography

Alexseev, M. A., (2001) *Decentralization versus State Collapse*, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 101-106

Balzer, M. M. And Vinokurova, U. A., (1996) *Nationalism, Interethnic Relations and Federalism: The Case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)*, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 101-121

Brown, A., (2001) Contemporary Russian Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chebankova, E. A., (2005) *The Limitations of Central Authority in the Regions and the Implications for the Evolution of Russia's Federal System*, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 7, pp. 933-949

Chebankova, E. A., (2006) *The Unintended Consequences of Gubernatorial Appointments in Russia, 2005-2006*, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 457-484

Chebankova, E. A., (2008) *Adaptive Federalism and Federation in Putin's Russia*, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60, No. 6, pp. 989-1009

Chubarov, A., (2001) Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity, London: Continuum

Derrick, M., (2009) *The merging of Russia's regions as applied Nationality policy: a suggested rational*, The Caucasian Review of International Affairs, [ONLINE] http://cria-online.org/Journal/8/Done_The%20Merging%20of%20Russias%20Regions%20as%20Applied%20Nationality%20Policy_Matthew%20Derrick.pdf [Accessed on 1st March 2010]

Economist, The (2004) *Having it Both Ways*, [ONLINE] www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=E1_JPGGTPR [Accessed on 19th February 2010]

Hahn, G., (2005) *Reforming the Federation*, ed. White, S., Gitelman, Z. And Sakwa, R., in Developments of Russian Politics 6, London: Palgrave-Macmillan

Herd, G. P., (2001) *Russia and the Politics of 'Putinism'*, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 107-112

Kahn, J., (2001) *What is the New Russian Federalism?* Ed. Brown, in Contemporary Russian Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 27, pp. 369-384

Kumar, R., (2008) *Putin's Legacy and the State of Democracy in Russia*, International Studies, vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 89-103

Kusznir, J., (2007) *The New Russian-Tatar Treaty and its Implications for Russian Federalism*, trans. Findlay, C., Russian Analytical Digest [ONLINE] <http://www.jeffersonhosting.com/Projects/Russia/Node/380> [Accessed on 1st February, 2010]

Malyakin, I., (2002) *Putin against the Regions: Round Two*, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol. 1, No. 2.

Orttung, R., (2004) *Putin's Federal Reform Package: A recipe for unchecked Kremlin Power*, Demokratizatsiya, [ONLINE] www.demokratizatsiya.org/dem%20archives/Dem%2004-3%20orttung.pdf [Accessed on 1st February, 2010]

Ostrovsky, A (2008) *The Wild South*, The Economist, November 29th-December 5th, pp. 14-17

Petrov, N., (2002) *Seven Faces of Putin's Russia: Federal Districts as the new level of State-Territorial Composition*, Security Dialogue, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 73-91

Petrov, N., (2003) *Federal Reform; Two and a Half Years On*, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol. 2, No. 1

Putin (2000) *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*, July 8th 2000, [ONLINE] http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2000/07/08/0000_type70029type82914_152371.shtml [Accessed on 11th February 2010]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2010) *Medvedev Creates New North Caucasus Federal District*, [Online] http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Creates_New_North_Caucasus_Federal_District/1934705.html [Accessed 20th February 2010]

Remington, T. F., (2005) *Parliamentary Politics in Russia*, ed. White, S., Gitelman, Z. And Sakwa, R., in *Developments of Russian Politics 6*, London: Palgrave-Macmillan

Remington, T. F., (2006) *Politics in Russia*, London: Pearson-Longman

RIA Novosti (2010) *Medvedev appoints ex-top manager in charge of volatile Caucasus*, [ONLINE] <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100119/157614943.html> [Accessed on 19th February 2010]

Ross, C., (2002) *Federalism and Democratization in Post-Communist Russia*, Manchester University Press, accessed 21st February 2010 from Coventry University Online Ebrary Database

Sakwa, R., (2004) *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London: Routledge

Sakwa, R., (2008a) *Russian Politics and Society*, London: Routledge

Sakwa, R., (2008b) *Putin's Leadership: Character and Consequences*, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 6, pp. 879-897

Sharlet, R., (2003) *Resisting Putin's Federal Reforms on the Legal Front*, Demokratizatsiya, [ONLINE], www.Demokratizatsiya.org/dem%20Archives/Dem%2011-3%20Sharlet.PDF pp. 335-342, [Accessed on 1st February 2010]

Slade, G., (2006) *Deconstructing the Millennium Manifesto: The Yeltsin-Putin Transition and the Rebirth of Ideology*, Journal of Russian and Asian Studies, vol. 4, [ONLINE] http://www.sras.org/deconstructing_the_millennium_manifesto [Accessed on 2nd February 2010]

Slider, D., (2005) *Politics in the Regions*, ed. White, S., Gitelman, Z. And Sakwa, R., in Developments of Russian Politics 6, London: Palgrave-Macmillan

The Economist, (2010) *Luzhkov v Kremlin*, The Economist, February 6th-February 12th 2010, pp. 41

Ware, R. B. And Kisriev, E., (2001) *Russian Recentralization arrives in the Republic of Dagestan: Implications for Institutional Integrity and Political Stability*, East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 10, No. 1

White, S., Gitelman, Z. And Sakwa, R., (2005) Developments in Russian Politics 6, London: Palgrave Macmillan

Willerton, J. P., (2005) *Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency*, ed. White, S., Gitelman, Z. And Sakwa, R., in Developments of Russian Politics 6, London: Palgrave-Macmillan